Relationship between population and economic development in the Colombo Plan Area. ASEAN the first 20 years. Gelombang kebangkitan Asia Anwar Ibrahim. Underdevelopment and economic nationalism in Southeast Asia Frank H.
Studies in the rural economy of South-East Asia by E. The economic development of South - east Asia studies in economic history and political economy edited by C. Emerging Southeast Asia a study in growth and stagnation Donald W. Black September nationalistic ego, indifference and greed throw Southeast Asia's equity and financial markets into turmoil Ranjit Gill.
Southeast Asia's economy development policies in the s a study sponsored by the Asian Development Bank H. Narrow Search Remove Filters. Like his predecessors, Trump has placed priority on relations with China, but unlike Obama who naively downplayed competition in the hope it would make the Chinese more cooperative, Trump has emphasized both aspects of the relationship.
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Trump has also reaffirmed U. There is no sign that his administration will let China's claims in the East and South China seas go unchallenged. The most important discontinuity is in trade where NSS makes abundantly clear that the focus will be on fair, not free, trade and that the Trump administration intends to take an aggressive approach to unfair trade and economic competition.
China with Russia was singled out for special attention. Most commentary on Xi's speech at the Chinese Communist Party's 19th Congress last October concentrated on China's global ambitions, but his overwhelming focus was in fact domestic. This is a fundamental issue because there is no practical alternative to Communist Party rule. Xi's greater emphasis on the party's role may have sharpened the dilemma. There is nothing unusual about a big country having big ambitions. Still, China's global ambitions, particularly the Belt and Road Initiative, are as much about dealing with this domestic challenge as they are about a new global strategy.
A new growth model at home requires structural changes that Beijing is not sure how to make without risking internal instability and potentially jeopardizing party rule. The BRI buys Beijing time. In his speech, Xi claimed that China "offers a new option for other countries and nations that want to speed up their development while preserving their independence.
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China's economic success over the past three decades debunks the idea that there is only one universal model of political and economic development. But it is becoming evident that transplanting the Chinese model overseas can bring serious financial liabilities for recipient countries, creating a "debt trap" for them.
Chinese leaders and officials have downplayed the strategic implications of the BRI and stressed its "win-win" economics. But the BRI is as much a defensive geopolitical gambit as it is an ambitious attempt to create a Sinocentric order. Fundamentally, the BRI is Beijing's attempt to break out from the unfavorable geopolitical situation it faces around its rim.
To the east, it faces Japan and South Korea, two important U.
North Korea vividly demonstrates China's inability to control events along its coastal rim. Unless North Korea can be dissuaded from acquiring the nuclear capability it seeks -- which is highly unlikely -- the resulting dynamic will eventually lead to Japan and South Korea acquiring their own nuclear deterrents within the U.
The addition of Japan and South Korea to the nuclear club would freeze the East Asian order in a way that would be disadvantageous to China, or at least would prevent Beijing from totally dominating the region. To the south, India, another nuclear weapon state, still lags behind China in power. New Delhi will have to learn to share the Indian Ocean space with China. But China cannot dominate that space either.
India is as ancient a civilization as China and will not subordinate itself to Beijing. Southeast Asia is a region of extreme diversity which has long defied attempts by major powers to grasp in its entirety. All major powers conduct "influence operations," but the Chinese do so more insistently with a developed institutional apparatus. Their operations have undoubtedly had fair successes in Southeast Asia. But the appeal to Overseas Chinese, that they should identify their interests with China's interests, brings China into sensitive territory in Southeast Asia, where race is an inescapable influence on politics and ethnic Chinese are not always a welcome minority.
Contiguity will always give Beijing significant influence in Southeast Asia. But China's influence along its coastal rim will always be contested by the U. S, Japan and India, among others. By contrast, Central Asia is in strategic flux, giving China the possibility of shaping the region, but not a free ride. Russia is concerned about growing Chinese influence in Central Asia. For now, it has had to swallow such concerns. But will Moscow remain forever passive?
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Despite its "win-win" justification, the BRI is in both economic and strategic terms a "China First" approach. That is why it has generated unease in many countries. BRI's implementation will at best be patchy and cannot be a practical alternative to the current international order. Can the BRI succeed if the U. China was the greatest beneficiary of post-Cold War globalization. It may be the greatest loser if globalization falters. The leader of an open international order must itself be open.